Introduction
People make moral decisions and moral judgments every day, often relying on an unconscious mental function — moral intuition, making it the subject of debate in both philosophy and psychology. This essay aims to answer one central question that has long captivated philosophers and psychologists including Carl Jung, W. D. Ross, and David Hume: Do we have any good reasons to trust our moral intuitions? It is crucial to first define “trust” in this context and clarify what is “moral intuition”. This inquiry actually unfolds itself into 2 subquestions: first, the descriptive and practical, can individuals depend on moral intuitions when making moral judgments in practical scenarios? This more particular and subjective perspective addresses the practicality and effectivity of moral intuition and will involve an empirical investigation into the validity of moral intuitions. The second question is normative: should people consider such moral judgments derived from intuition as “ethical”? The normativity of the second question addresses that in order to be ethical, we should trust such judgments or not.
In the subsequent sections, this essay will define relevant terms in the introduction, and then analyze each perspective thoroughly in sections 2 and 3. From a descriptive perspective, I assert that individuals can, and often do, depend on their moral intuitions to form judgments, and one can trust moral intuitions because they are accurate, effective, and practical. However, from a normative standpoint, I advocate for the principle of reflective equilibrium: moral intuitions must be diligently balanced with critical reflection to uphold ethical correctness in moral judgments. Therefore, although there are valid reasons to trust moral intuitions for personal and practical decision-making, it is crucial, from a normative standpoint, not to rely solely on these intuitive judgments. Instead, ongoing critical reflection is necessary to ensure that our moral intuitions align with ethical standards so that everyone could live a good life.
Definition: Trust
The nature of trust involves “some form of optimism that the trustee will take care of things as we have entrusted them” (Carter). Intuition is a cognitive ability as the trustee (Ross), and “trust” on a cognitive ability thus refers to justified confidence in the reliability of it as a source or process to provide guidance that is likely true. It is referred to as “epistemic trust” (Markova): reliance on a source of knowledge considered capable of yielding true beliefs. If we trust a moral intuition epistemically, we need to evaluate whether these intuitive judgments are reliable for making ethical decisions and validatable moral judgments. Thus, when we say we “trust” moral intuitions, we mean 2 aspects: in a personal and practical sense, facing a scenario demanding moral judgment, we rely on moral intuition to judge; in a ethical sense, we rely on moral intuition as a source of moral knowledge while we think the moral judgment made by moral intuition is ethically correct. These 2 aspects will correspond to the descriptive and normative dimensions in the following discussion. .
Definition of moral intuition
The most consensual definition of moral intuition is that moral intuition is the immediate and non-inferential perception of moral truths (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). These intuitions are pre-reflective, often experienced as compelling feelings or gut responses to moral situations, which do not arise from reasoning or deliberate ethical analysis that the subject is conscious of. One just "just sees without argument that they are and must be true" (Harrison). Moral intuitions enable individuals to quickly and often subconsciously judge an action as right or wrong. However, such a quick, non-conscious process does not suggest that intuition is irrational: psychologists found through studies that intuition is a “dual process” (Kahneman), meaning that the mechanism of intuition lies in the mind automatically collecting information and goes through an unconscious analysis before yielding the moral judgment. Thus, the presumption that intuition is irrational is an invalidated and outdated stereotype.
When an individual faces a moral scenario, can they trust their moral intuition?
When individuals encounter moral dilemmas, they often rely on their moral intuitions to guide their decisions. This reliance is not merely a matter of convenience: in fact, empirical research done in moral psychology suggest choices made based on moral intuition mostly align with those that would result from deliberate conscious reasoning. In Cushman F, Young L, and Hauser M’s 2006 study “The role of conscious reasoning and intuition moral judgment: testing three principles of Harm”, researchers investigate how people use intuition and conscious reasoning in making moral judgments, and the answer is they align with each other — moral intuition is accurate.
This study examines the relationship between intuitive and reasoned responses to moral dilemmas, focusing on the three most recognized principles that are consensual in philosophy: the Action Principle — harms caused by action are perceived as worse than harms caused by omission, the Doctrine of Double Effect — harm intended as a means to an end is worse than harm that is a foreseen but unintended side effect, and the Contact Principle — harm involving physical contact with a victim is seen as worse than harm that involves no such contact. In the experiment, the participants are asked to rate the correctness of hypothetical situations of a subject responding to different versions of the trolley problem (the switch and the footbridge). Each different scenario contains one of the three principles and their moral judgments are asked to be made immediately with “gut feelings” — intuition. The results of the study showed that subjects' intuitive judgments generally aligned with the three principles, as they judged actions involving direct harm and physical contact as morally worse than their counterparts, intentional harm worse than unintended harm. When asked after their judgments are made, most participants provide consistent post-hoc reasoning of their decision — and do not change their opinion after conscious reasoning; given the fact that they were not informed about the three principles, this study proves that moral intuition mostly aligns with conscious reasoning.
These findings prove that while individuals may not always consciously reason through every moral dilemma, yet their intuitive judgments are not random; instead, they contain an unconscious process of reasoning, and their intuitive feelings frequently reflect established moral principles, even if these principles are not consciously articulated at the moment of decision. This alignment underscores the epistemic trustworthiness of moral intuitions, suggesting that they are not merely arbitrary emotional responses but are anchored in cognitive processes that are both rational and adaptive. Consequently, individuals have good reasons to trust their moral intuitions. This trust is not blind but is grounded in the understanding that our intuitive moral judgments are generally well-aligned with thoughtful, principled moral reasoning, found in empirical studies.
The social Intuitionist proposed by Jonathan Haidt in his literature review of relevant moral psychology researchers titled “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment” provides an explanation for this alignment. Haidt’s review supports Cushman’s study by explaining that in his findings, most rational justifications and moral principles, while seeming to underlie moral judgments, often actually serve as post-hoc rationalizations of intuitive decisions made earlier. Intuitions, formed as an encapsulation of personal experiences and cultural teachings, are dedicated to most moral arguments, which aligns with Nietzsche’s argument of perspectivism that a person’s opinion is a result of his experience, and the argument he makes is a post-hoc justification of that pre-determined opinion. As suggested by evolutionary psychologists, intuition is formed when the brain automatically processes the reasoning process unconsciously.
In summary, when individuals are making daily moral judgments, it is safe for them to trust their moral intuition, because it will produce a moral judgment aligning with the judgment they make with conscious reasoning, as the empirical moral psychology research by Cushman and the social intuitionist model of Haidt suggest. Moral intuition should be trusted for its accuracy, effectiveness, and practicality.
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