Should we trust our moral intuitions?
This section will go beyond the descriptive truth that people’s intuitive moral judgment aligns with reasoned moral judgment and its subsequent claim that people can trust moral intuitions. It will answer a normative statement: should we trust our moral intuitions?
Haidt’s Social Intuitionist model states that moral intuitions are not solely innate or purely self-evident truths, demonstrating instead how they are significantly shaped by societal discourse and cultural backgrounds. While moral intuitions often align with conscious reasoning, both conscious reasoning, which is dominated by established moral principles, and moral intuitions are influenced by prevailing social norms and established values. Consequently, what we perceive as "moral" is deeply embedded within cultural discourse and dictated by power dynamics, introducing biases that can lead to unethical judgments. Michel Foucault argued that such judgments can perpetuate oppression. For instance, in societies where historical or religious discourse does not advocate for homosexuality or gender equality, individuals raised within these contexts may develop moral intuitions that view the advocacy for gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights, and abolition as immoral. This has historically led to the oppression and disenfranchisement of these minorities, which by broader ethical standards is clearly unjust because such oppression causes human suffering and systemic injustice — undeniably unethical.
Given the unneglicable and potentially oppressive impact of social and cultural factors on moral intuitions, it is essential to adopt John Rawls' concept of reflective equilibrium. This method mandates a continuous adjustment of our moral beliefs and intuitions through thoughtful reflection, with the goal of refining and achieving coherence in our moral principles and judgments. Reflective equilibrium compels individuals to critically examine the societal discourses and cultural norms they have absorbed, thereby cultivating moral intuitions that are progressive and less likely to be oppressive.
This approach does not diminish the role of intuition in moral reasoning; indeed, it promotes a dynamic cooperation between intuition and reflective thinking. Critical reflections and examinations enhance the epistemic foundations of our moral judgments by correcting and scrutinizing the injustice in society so that moral intuitions fostered by societal discourse can be more ethical. By fostering such an environment, reflective equilibrium not only advances individual ethical awareness but also promotes societal growth, enhancing good living for all. This method underscores the necessity of continually refining our moral framework to ensure it aligns with an evolving understanding of justice and human rights, thus making moral intuition a better and more ethical tool in the pursuit of a fairer society.
In conclusion, this paper argues for a dialectical approach to moral decision-making. People have good reasons out of practicalitypraticality and effectiveness to trust their moral intuition in daily scenarios; nevertheless, they are influenced by societal and cultural contexts, which might be biased. Thus, adopting the principle of reflective equilibrium is essential for such moral judgment to be ethical, as it ensures that these intuitions are critically assessed and aligned with broader ethical standards, further refining the societal cultural values to be more just, fostering a positive cycle.
Works Cited
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