The Objection from Disagreement
Critics point to the epistemic limitations of moral intuitions by arguing that disagreements among these intuitions reveal their inconsistency, thus undermining internal harmony and hindering the formation of a societal moral consensus (Weinberg). For example, there seem to be significant moral disagreements on policies such as mandatory vaccination. However, these disagreements often stem from differing factual beliefs, not disagreements on fundamental moral principles. In this case of vaccinations, proponents support it because they believe in the safety and efficacy of vaccines, and opponents fear potential harm, while both sides try to promote public welfare.
Most disagreements on moral intuitions are indeed traceable to differences in factual beliefs — there’s a broader consensus on fundamental moral principles. Other disagreements, such as the disagreement between utilitarianists’ and deontologists’ intuitive responses to the trolley problem, derive from deeper philosophical divides. Yet, these are not systematic issues with moral intuitions but the subtleties in philosophical commitments that arise under rational reasoning. The subtle differences do not undermine the internal harmony of moral intuitions; instead, they are complementary and contribute to a broader, practical harmony. For instance, utilitarianism provides insights into the impacts of actions on societal welfare, and deontology emphasizes the importance of justice. In practical cases, people use utilitarianism when broader societal impacts are considered, and deontology when upholding individual justice.
Moreover, the trolley problem, designed as a theoretical tool to provoke moral reflection and highlight philosophical differences in the binary opposite choices, doesn’t mirror everyday situations, where one often exercises this practical harmony and moral intuitions reliably guide judgments.
Thus, moral intuitions are a reliable source of moral judgment and a legitimate epistemic method.
Continuous Refinement of Our Moral Senses
Although moral intuitions are in good working order epistemically, they should not be trusted unconditionally. In practice, both moral intuitions and conscious reasoning sometimes fail to produce rational outcomes and are influenced by cultural biases. Consequently, while moral intuitions can provide valuable insights, their role as a source of moral authority should be taken with caution.
To ensure that our moral judgments are just, it’s critical that we cultivate our moral senses — both moral intuitions and conscious reasoning. Unexamined influences, such as biases that permeate through education, family teachings, and social norms, as well as language and media representation, can significantly distort both our intuitive and deliberative judgments.
For a long time, many cultures viewed LGBTQ identities through a moral lens heavily influenced by religious norms that labeled these identities as immoral or abnormal. These views were deeply entrenched in laws and societal attitudes that framed LGBTQ identities negatively. The negative moral attitude was intuitive to many people whose upbringings were homophobic, and this discrimination is further justified by conscious reasoning based on misconception, lack of knowledge, or outright biases. However, over time, scientific understanding of LGBTQ advanced, social movements advocating for LGBTQ rights gained momentum, and exposure to different narratives increased; people reevaluated their initial intuitions and reasoning, demonstrating that moral intuitions aren’t fixed but subject to change in response to new information, changing cultural contexts, and ethical reflections.
It’s imperative to continually refine our moral epistemic methods by constantly reflecting on the diverse types of information we encounter. The strategy of reflective equilibrium, proposed by John Rawls, is one effective way to ensure this by harmonizing our specific judgments with broader moral principles, adjusting and re-adjusting the beliefs seeking new arguments and evidence to achieve coherence to ensure that they are well-founded. Moreover, engaging with cross-cultural and multi-narrative dialogues can also be effective. In exposing ourselves to multiple perspectives, we challenge our preconceived notions, examine cultural biases, and expand our understanding of moral issues, as well as reveal the hidden biases in our moral reasoning and intuitions by transcending our immediate cultural context. Ultimately, we cultivate a more inclusive and informed outlook, leading to fairer judgments.
Works Cited
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