Trusting moral intuitions - John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer-Landau
Claim: moral intuitions are trustworthy, based on the Trustworthiness criterion: moral intuitions are trustworthy because they are the outputs of a cognitive practice
We will defend a version of moral intuitionism according to which moral intuitions (α) have positive epistemic status, namely, trustworthiness; (β) do not have that status fully in virtue of facts about coherence, inferential role, or other such intra- or inter-attitudinal connections; and (γ ) are in normal circumstances4 sufficient to yield trustworthy moral beliefs
Def of moral intuition
Intuition = a conscious non-sensory mental state or event in which it strikes one that things are a certain way when one reflects on the matter
Moral intuitions = intuitions about moral matters, concern about the moral status of a type of behavior, particular behaviors, moral reasons, obligations, principles…
Sometimes psychological bases of moral beliefs and judgments
We will defend a version of moral intuitionism according to which moral intuitions (α) have positive epistemic status, namely, trustworthiness; (β) do not have that status fully in virtue of facts about coherence, inferential role, or other such intra- or inter-attitudinal connections; and (γ ) are in normal circumstances4 sufficient to yield trustworthy moral beliefs
Intuitions are not beliefs or judgments, but rather non-doxastic epistemic bases of such doxastic states
Moral intuitionists are fallible
Intuitions can have explanation or proof
Moral intuitionism here emphasizes a range of features, including social dimensions
Moral intuitionism isn’t moral nonnaturalism, but non-naturalism is a metaphysical position regarding the nature of moral reality
II. trustworthiness
To trust is X to cognitively rely on X, to employ X to form, maintain, or revise the agent’s attitudes with the aim of increasing, improving, or otherwise positively contributing to her stock of knowledge or understanding regarding X’s contents
Trustworthiness is thus warranted cognitive reliance
Warrant
Graduable
Not obligatory
Defeasible
Warrant is an epistemic notion
III. the trustworthiness criterion
Cognitive practice
Cognitive practice: a set of activities and events, with social dimensions, into which we are inducted in suitable conditions, yields a certain range of representational states as outputs, including psychological basis, intuition
Moral intuition practice is one of the cognitive practice
Cultivated by social learning: they are social practices in working order
Working order: 1) socially well-established; 2) deeply entrenched; 3) makes available sophisticated methods of critically evaluating its outputs; 4) engenders achievement; 5) is internally harmonious
The trustworthiness criterion (initial statement) for a cognitive practice: If a cognitive practice P is in good working order, then P’s outputs are trustworthy for participants in P (warrantedly reliable)
It’s neutral with respect to other features of these outputs, etc, “objectivity”
Compatible with subjectivity; does not stack the deck in favor of non-subjectivist theories
Why would fulfillment of conditions “in working order” for a cognitive practice that is epistemically excellent bring trustworthiness?
Such reliance exhibits these features because the cognitive practice that generated these outputs is itself epistemically excellent
IV. examining the status of moral intuitions
It fulfills the conditions
Sophisticated methods of critical evaluation?
Consistency, corroboration, confirmation - yes. It is checkable
Coherent (reflective equilibrium)
Reflection on concepts
People’s intuition on some matters might disagree, but on others align — e.g it’s right to protect one’s children from lethal danger.
Any genuine intuitional conflict about such platitudes and their direct application is minimal, traceable to another flaw, or not systemic
The moral disagreement can be traced to
Different, incompatible factual beliefs
governing the relative weight (epistemic, prudential, or moral) of various sorts of considerations
different, perhaps incompatible ancillary moral beliefs or judgments.
A and b are not really morally significant; b and c are only sometimes fully based on moral intuitions but are more of reasoning
Moral intuitions are descriptive and evaluative
Moral intuition is in good working order, epistemically
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